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ABORTIVE REASONS AND OBSCENE STANDARDS: A
COMMENT ON THE ABORTION AND OBSCENITY
CASES
ARNOLD H. LOEWYt
The 1972 term of the Supreme Court was certainly not devoid of
outstanding opinions.' Thus, it is regrettable that the term will be re-
membered best for two of the most unfortunate series of decisions in
recent years - the abortion cases2 and the obscenity cases.3 Not only
were these cases wrongly decided in the abstract, but when juxtaposed
together, they reflect a strangely convoluted concept of constitutional
values for the Supreme Court to be espousing.'
ABORTION CASES
Like most things which turn out wrong, including the proverbial
"road to hell", Roe v. Wade5 and Doe v. Bolton6 are paved with good
intentions. The emotional impact of a woman with an unwanted preg-
nancy can be strong indeed. Thus one can appreciate and indeed be
grateful for the humanitarian instincts that undoubtedly impelled the
Court to hold that (1) during the first trimester of pregnancy, the State
may not interfere with the judgment of a patient and her medical doctor7
in regard to the abortion decision, (2) during the second trimester, the
State may interfere only to the extent of licensing the abortion facility
f Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'It is probably too early to assess which opinions will ultimately be entitled to this accolade.
In my opinion, some likely candidates include Mr. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), both Powell's opinion for the Court and Mr. Justice
Marshall's dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1315
(1973), and Marshall's dissent in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 458 (1973). Mr. Justice
Brennan's dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2642 (1973), which is one of
the subjects of this article, may well have been the best opinion of the entire term.
2Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973): Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
'Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628
(1973): United States v. 12-200 Ft. Reels of Super 8 MM. Film, 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973); United
States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973).
1See text accompanying notes 108-11 infra. In fairness to the whole Court. it should be noted
that only Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Powell were with the majority in both
cases.
5410 U.S. 113 (1973).
S410 U.S. 179 (1973).
'The question of paternal rights, if any, was explicitly left open, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
164 n.67 (1973).
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and the abortionist, and (3) during the third trimester, abortion may be
prohibited except where necessary to protect the life or health of the
mother. Humanitarianism, however, important as it is, cannot replace
analysis nor justify misanalysis if the Court is to be worthy of the respect
that traditionally has been accorded to it.
Roe begins hopefully enough:
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measure-
ment free of emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this
... .We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition in his
now vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York: "It [the Constitution]
is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident
of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even
shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the
United States."8
The first step in the Court's analysis was to categorize a pregnant
woman's abortion decision as part of her fundamental right to privacy,
thereby requiring "a compelling state interest" to justify impinging
upon it. This was obviously an important step because it effectively
shifted the burden of establishing constitutionality to the state rather
than according the statute the usual presumption of constitutionality.
And, of course, the term "compelling" can be a well-nigh insuperable
burden when the Court wants it to be.? Yet, whatever may be said about
the fundamental nature of the decision to have an abortion, it seems
difficult to believe that the right to privacy has anything to do with it.'0
Quite simply, abortions are not performed in private. They are per-
formed in places in which the public has an interest, such as hospitals,
clinics, or maybe doctors' offices, but surely not in the privacy of one's
home." Furthermore, the very essence of a privacy claim would seem
'Id. at 117, quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
?See. e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). But cf. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
"At one point, the Court seems to say as much: "In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim
asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears
a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions." 410 U.S.
at 154. See also Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
929-33 (1973).
"At least not legal abortions. Although it is possible to read Doe v. Bolton as forbidding an
anti-home regulation as the locus of abortion during the first three months. Maybe the Court
means that the right to abortion is necessary in that the future quality of one's sex life is dependent
upon one's obtaining an abortion. If that is the Court's theory, it is not clearly articulated.
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to suggest that the activity for which protection is sought be victimless."2
Thus, for a privacy claim to be sustained, it is not only necessary for
the Court to conclude that an under six month embryo or fetus is not a
human being, but that it cannot even be permitted to attain the status
of a victim.' :'
Because a fundamental right to an abortion cannot be established
from the right to privacy, however, does not mean that such a right
cannot be established at all. Probably, the fundamental right to pro-
create" does or should include the right not to procreate, particularly
in view of Griswold v. Connecticut.5 Hence, it is arguable that the right
to abortion is included within this non-procreative right. Though sound-
er than the Court's analysis, this argument is also shaky because of the
very real difference between the right not to create (non-procreation)
and the right to destroy (abortion). Once conception has occurred a new
entity, whether human or not,'" has been produced and things simply are
not as they once were. As Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said in another
context many years ago: "The past cannot be recalled by the most
absolute power.
' '1 7
Furthermore, it seems inconsistent with United States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973); see note 12
infra.
'-Even where the crime is victimless, the Court has been in no hurry to extend the right to
privacy. It turned down an opportunity to constitutionalize the right to fornication in Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). And in United States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973), it held that
the right to view obscenity in the privacy of one's home does not extend to the right to transport
such film in interstate commerce.
"Of course, not all victims of crime are human beings. See Ely, supra note 10, at 926. Dogs
and cats are protected under cruelty to animals statutes and flags are protected under flag desecra-
tion statutes, (see Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371 (1970)) despite first amendment arguments
that seem to me to be compelling. See Loewy, Punishing Flag Desecrators: The Ultimate In Flag
Desecration. 49 N.C.L. REv. 48 (1970). Although one might argue that cruelty to animals statutes
exist to protect people's feelings about animals rather than the animals themselves, there would
seem to be no basis for assuming that the average citizen feels more strongly about animals than
he (or she) does about fetuses.
"At least arguably established by Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
'381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding the right of marital use of contraceptive devices to be constitu-
tionally protected), discussed at text accompanying notes 51-57 infra.
"At minimum, it is an organism with a full set of human genes. See text accompanying notes
26-28 infra.
"Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810). This is a complete answer to Mr. Justice
Clark's question: "If an individual may prevent conception, why can he not nullify that conception
when prevention has failed?" Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A ConstitutionalAppraisal,
2 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1, 9 (1969). It is also a complete answer to Professor Heymann and Attorney
Bar/clay who contend that "it]he couple's right to decide whether to have a family [in the abortion
contexti is the very same right as that established and protected in the cases dealing with contracep-
tion .. .- They argue that the only difference between Roe and Griswold is "the asserted state
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Once it determined that abortion was a fundamental right, the
Court's reasoning went from bad to worse. After concluding (correctly
in my opinion) that a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment,'8 the Court turned to the State's argument that
"apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and
is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a
compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception."'"
The Court's response begins in a manner calculated to make one believe
that it really had remembered the "now vindicated dissent in Lochner
v. New York" 20 and in classic Holmesian language wrote:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this
point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer.
2'
From this, the reader would naturally assume that the statute would be
sustained 22 since he surely must suppose that the Court is not about to
deny the State's right to preserve what it considers human life in the
absence of an authoritative determination that that which is being pro-
tected is something other than human life. However, with a startling
piece of legal legerdemain, sadly reminiscent of the New Deal Court's
invalidation of the first Agricultural Adjustment Act,2s the Court op-
interest" in Roe. Heymann & Barzelay The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics,
53 B.U.L. REv. 765, 775 (1973). By that reasoning, I suppose one could argue (although Heymann
and Bar/clay do not) that couples have a fundamental right to infanticide, limited only by the
State's compelling interest in preserving the infant. All though the ultimate result in such a case
(no constitutional right) is satisfactory, it seems inconceivable that any court would employ such
a tortured analysis to reach its result. While I readily concede that killing an embryo or fetus is
not the same thing as killing an infant (that's why it's called abortion rather than murder), it is
also not the same thing as using a contraceptive device, and the fundamentality of one does not
follow from the other.
"If a fetus were deemed a person for fourteenth amendment purposes, presumably abortion
would have to be punished as severely as murder under the equal protection clause. Such a
requirement seems as unreasonable as requiring the state to accord the fetus no rights at all. Th6
extent to which fetal rights should approach personal rights should be determined by the various
legislatures for the reasons presented in this article.
"1410 U.S. at 159.
"'So categorized by Roe. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
-1410 U.S. at 159.
--But for the fact that at the outset of the Court's opinion, he was told otherwise.
2United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936), wherein the Court stated that it was adopting
the broad Hamiltonian rather than the narrow Madisonian view of the Federal taxing power and
then proceeded to invalidate the tax under the tenth amendment (which by its terms is applicable
[Vol. 52
ABORTION AND OBSCENITY
ined: "In view of all this [the different theories of when life begins], we
do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override
the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake." 4 Thus, we have
the spectacle of the highest Court in the land telling a sovereign state
that even though it may be correct that life begins at conception, that
possibility is not sufficient to justify a law designed to protect this life.
Surely Rufus Peckham (the author of Lochner) would have been
prouder of this approach than Oliver Wendell Holmes.1
5
Part of the tragedy of this faulty analysis is that it could have been
avoided by focusing on points of agreement rather than disagreement.
It is universally agreed26 that from the moment of conception, the zygote
(in its early stages called an embryo and later a fetus) is an organism
with a full set of human genes and not merely something with the
potential to develop into a live human beingY Had the Court recognized
this uncontroverted fact, it would not have had to choose between allow-
ing Texas to treat conception as the beginning of "life" on the one hand
or merely a future interest on the other. Correct categorization of the
State's interest, would have not only avoided the necessity of the Court's
Lochneresque unwillingness to allow the State to choose which expert
to believe, but, hopefully, would have caused it to find the State's inter-
est sufficiently "compelling" to sustain the statute.
only where the Federal government is not empowered to act), thereby effectively adopting an
approach more like that which it was purporting to reject than like one it was purporting to accept.
21410 U.S. at 162.
2"While the Court's opinion quotes from the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in Lochner v.
New York, . . . the result it reaches is more closely attuned to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice
Peckham in that case." 410 U.S. at 171. (dissenting opinion of Rehnquist, J.). I do not purport to
know the actual views of either Peckham or Holmes on the abortion issue, although in the latter's
case, his personal views would have been irrelevant.
21At least I have never heard of any disagreement on this point either in my role as counsel
for the State in Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971), or as a participant with
medical doctors on an abortion panel during a population workshop at the University of North
Carolina at Charlotte.
"'"Genetically, the adult man was from such a beginning all that he essentially has become in
every cell and human attribute." Rosen v. Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1223
(E.D. La. 1970) citing H. GRAY, ANATOMY OF THE HUMAN BODY 21-60 (Goss 27th ed. 1959) and
5 LAWYERS* MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 37.1 (1960).
2After all, it held an interest in mere "potential life" from and after "viability" to be suffi-
ciently "compelling." 410 U.S. at 163-64. Of course, there is the possibility that the Court would
say that even an organism with a full set of human genes cannot be protected as a matter of
constitutional law at the expense of a contrary maternal choice. Judge Newman so ruled, by
defining the right to abortion as "a constitutional right of special significance," and applying, in
effect, a super compelling state interest test. Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 231 (D. Conn.
1972). Assuming, however, that the word "compelling" does not mean significantly more than it
1973]
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Having concluded that the Court's opinion cannot withstand analy-
sis, it seems appropriate to consider whether the same result could have
been reached on other grounds. One potential ground noted, but not
pursued, by the Court is that abortion statutes were not passed to pro-
tect embryonic or fetal life, but to prevent injury to the expectant
mother.29 For one supporting the unconstitutionality of abortion laws,
this is an attractive argument. After all, once prenatal life is eliminated
as an interest, the State's argument boils down to an interest in prevent-
ing an immediate surgical removal of a "benign uterine tumor" (which
in the first three months is apparently safer than or at least as safe as
childbirth)30 in favor of "natural removal" up to nine months later, -
an interest whose sufficiency is very doubtful, to say the least, in view
of Griswold.3 ' Nevertheless, despite the surface attractiveness of this
argument there are such serious deficiencies in it that it is to the Court's
credit that it did not opt for this easy way out. First of all, there is
substantial disagreement as to the original purpose of the abortion
laws.32 Secondly, even if the original purpose of a statute is no longer
operative or permissible, the Court ought not to invalidate a statute for
that reason when other justifications provided present day vivification.
Certainly that was the Court's position in McGowan v. Maryland where
it sustained a Sunday closing law because of its present day secular
justification, notwithstanding the religious motivation which had
prompted its original passage.3 3 Finally, it is hard to challenge Mr.
Justice Black's observation for the Court in Palmer v. Thompson that
there is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law
because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is struck down
for this reason, rather than because of its facial content or effect, it
would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant gov-
erning body repassed it for different reasons.34
meant in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 374, 377-78"(1968) (a freedom of speech case), it is
hard to understand how the State's interest in an organism with a full set of human genes could
be less than "compelling."
-"410 U.S. at 149-50. The Court also alluded to but quite correctly dismissed the argument
(made by none of the States) that a purpose of anti-abortion laws was "to discourage illicit sexual
conduct."
'See 410 U.S. at 149 n.44.
"'Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). discussed at text accompanying notes 51-57
ilnfra.
.Compare the concurring and dissenting opinions of Judges Newman and Clarie respectively
in Abele v. Markle. 342 F. Supp. 800, 805, 812 (D. Conn. 1972).
33366 U.S. 420, 446-49 (1961).
31403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971). Indeed, this is precisely what was attempted in Connecticut, where
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There is one other potential justification for Roe which may be the
"real" reason for the Court's decision. That is, where the legislature
balances two competing considerations in a manner which seems clearly
wrong to a majority of the Court, it is the duty of that majority to
reverse this imbalance through the due process clause. In response to
this argument,35 one can hardly resist Judge Learned Hand's cryptic
rebuttal: "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy
of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I
assuredly do not. ' 3 Before concluding that Roe was wrongly decided,
however, we should examine the "Platonic Guardian" theory more
closely. After all, even Learned Hand wasn't right all of the time.
37
I suppose the "Platonic Guardian" approach would sit better if
each individual were confident that his "platonic guardian" Justice
would agree with him all (or at least, most) of the time. Yet, those who
would be sublimely happy to have William Douglas as their "Guardian"
surely must have qualms about casting that accolade upon William
Rehnquist. Similarly those who would be confident with Mr. Justice
Rehnquist would not be with Mr. Justice Douglas. This would seem to
demonstrate that if Justices were intended to be "Guardians" they
would almost certainly have been chosen in a more democratic manner
than they are .3 Fortunately, we do not have to rely entirely on theory.
The 1905-1937 experiment with Platonic Guardianism provides ample
proof of the incompatibility of this approach with the democratic pro-
on April 18, 1972, by a two to one decision, a Three-Judge Federal Court invalidated Connecticut's
anti-abortion statute with one of the judges relying on the non-fetus protecting motive of the
legislature. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972). See especially the opinion of
Newman, i., at 805. In a May special session, Connecticut passed a new anti-abortion statute
declaring it to be the legislative intent "to protect and preserve human life from the moment of
conception." The new statute was also invalidated. Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn.
1972), see note 28 supra.
'5This argument has been suggested to me with sufficient frequency to satisfy me that I am
not creating a straw man. Some would limit this duty to those issues in which emotionalism runs
so high as to render rational legislative judgment unlikely. My principal difficulty with this limita-
tion (apart from the identity problem) is that deeply emotional issues which sharply divide the
populace and to which no provision of the Constitution explicitly or by fair inference addresses
itself, are precisely the issues upon which a Court in a democratic society should defer to legislative
judgment.
:1L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 73 (1958).
1 would quarrel with his criticism of Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). L.
HAND, supra note 36, at 51.
"Intending no disrespect, I doubt that either Douglas or Rehnquist (or for that matter, quite
possibly any Justice currently sitting) would win a national election for the office of "Platonic
Guardian."
229'19731
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cesses. "Y Of course, it is sometimes argued (though rarely in public) that
the old Court contained "bad Platonic Guardians" because they were
backward looking reactionaries whereas the Roe Court has "good
Guardians" who are progressive and forward looking.' Apart from the
fact that the Constitution was not written for only progressives, I submit
that it is impossible to say with assurance what the future will hold.
Undoubtedly, the Lochner majority believed that the principle of free-
dom of contract in labor negotiations would last till the heavens swal-
lowed the earth. Similarly, we have no way of knowing whether ten
years from now, abortion will not be more abhored by society that it is
today and that the value judgment of the Roe majority won't be rejected
as much as we reject the Lochner value judgment today.4 Of course, I
am not saying that this will happen, simply that we do not and cannot
know that it would not.
To extricate themselves from the Lochner analogy, proponents of
the Roe result sometimes argue that a sharp dichotomy should be drawn
between economic rights and personal rights, and that the impropriety
ofjudicial invalidation should be limited to the former.42 Although there
is a good deal of surface attractiveness in this argument for a judge
wishing to invalidate an abortion statute, it cannot survive close analy-
sis. First of all, the terms "economic" and "personal" are far from clear
in this context. Of course, most bakers who work more than sixty hours
per week do so for economic reasons, and many women obtain abor-
tions for personal reasons. But undoubtedly there are some bakers who
would like to work more than sixty hours per week for personal self
fulfillment and more than a few women who desire abortions for eco-
nomic reasons. Thus, the economic-personal dichotomy will not work.
Does this mean that the Court must supinely accept all legislation
as constitutional regardless of how outrageous it may be if it can find
nothing other than substantive due process upon which to predicate a
finding of unconstitutionality? The Court has so held43 and there is a
"Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) is as good an example as any.
"At least for the Roe decision. It is possible, however, that some would question the consist-
ency with which some members of the Roe majority could be characterized as "progressive and
forward looking."
"Factors which conceivably could cause this include (I) a substantially reduced birth rate, (2)
increasing ease of embryonic and fetal development outside of the womb, and (3) a more sophisti-
cated understanding of prenatal development.
I-This position was advocated during oral argument by Roy Lucas, counsel for the plaintiffs,
in Corkey v. Edwards. 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971). See also Note, In Defense of LIberiyv
.I Look at the Abortion Decisions, 61 GEo. L.J. 1559, 1566 (1973).
"See. e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Indeed, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
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good deal of force in this position." Nevertheless, it seems to me that
we do not concede the judiciary too much by permitting it to invalidate
a statute that abridges a right which though not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution can fairly be categorized as fundamental." It should
be obvious that in this regard, the Court must be extremely careful to
act with due humility46 lest it turn its own predeliction of good policy
into a fundamental right. Probably the most thoughtful definition of
fundamentality was delivered by Mr. Justice Goldberg in his Griswold
v. Connecticut concurring opinion:
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at
large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions.
Rather, they must look to the "traditions and [collective] conscience
of our people" to determine whether a principal is "so rooted [there]
• . . as to be ranked as fundamental." The inquiry is whether a right
involved "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violat-
ing 'those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our institutions' . ... 4
Although this definition is helpful, it really doesn't tell a Justice how
he is to ascertain things like "the traditions and collective conscience
of our people." That answer is probably implicit in Holmes' dissent in
Lochner v. New York where he argued
that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when
it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless
it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that
the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.4"
With abortion laws as with maximum hour laws, "it does not need
research to show that no such sweeping condemnation can be passed
U.S. 479 (1965), is susceptible to such an interpretation.
"See particularly the dissenting opinions of Black and Stewart, JJ., in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut. 381 U.S. 479, 507, 527 (1965).
"Although not completely comfortable with this position, it seems to me to be less intolerable
than any other alternative. Perhaps, it is implicit in the concept of "a constitution intended to
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). Or, maybe the position can be
justilied by the philosophy behind the ninth amendment.
".See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952).
"1381 U.S. at 493, quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), and Powell v.
Alabama. 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
1"198 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added).
19731
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upon the statute before [the Court]."4 It might be contended, however,
that Holmes' dissent is unsound (notwithstanding Roe's "now vindi-
cated" categorization of it) because there would hardly ever be a law
that all rational and fair men would condemn. After all, legislators are
not generally irrational, unfair or otherwise incompetent. Of course, one
answer to this argument might be that the Court should not be invalidat-
ing laws on substantive due process grounds anyway. I believe that a
better answer is that occasionally a law will seriously impinge upon
personal liberty for a reason which is itself constitutionally invalid. A
good example is Griswold v. Connecticut5 where the purported justifi-
cation for the Connecticut anti-contraceptive law was so ludicrous as to
defy belief.52 One has to believe that the real reason for the law was a
desire to prevent the employment of artificial devices to render sexual
activity non-procreative even between married couples.53 Obviously,
this is reasonably related to enforcing a religious view held by a large
number of Connecticut citizens.54 However, no rational or fair man that
I know or could imagine would find this to be a legitimate secular
purpose. 15 Since there was no apparent reasonable purpose for what all
must agree was a serious intrusion on marital privacy, I believe that the
19Id.
1'See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
5'381 U.S. 479 (1965).
The State's argument as explained by Mr. Justice White was that forbidding marital use of
contraceptive devices rendered it less likely that people would possess such devices for use in
extramarital affairs, thereby deterring such affairs. It was not disputed, however, that contraceptive
devices were readily available and that their sale for the prevention of disease appeared to be per.
missible. Thus, the State's interest was predicated on the possibility that a person not already de-
terred from adultery by the anti-adultery law would be deterred by the anti-use-of-contraceptive
law notwithstanding the ready availability of such contraceptives. With classic understatement,
Mr. Justice White declared this premise to be one "whose intrinsic validity is not very apparent."
Id. at 507 (concurring opinion).
"The Connecticut Supreme Court has not been entirely clear on this point, but in State v.
Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 424, 11 A.2d 856, 861 (1940), it did opine that "the Legislature might...
reasonably hold that the artificial limitation on even legitimate child-bearing would be inimical to
the public welfare .. "
"'This appears to be the position of the Catholic Church, PAUL VI, ON THE REGULATION OF
BIRTH (Evangelical Letter 1968), whose members comprise about forty percent of the Connecticut
population. See 1973-1974 STATESMAN'S YEAR BOOK 605 (1 10th ed. 1973), which lists the Roman
Catholic population of Connecticut at 1,272,473. The Connecticut population recorded in the 1970
census was 3.032,217, 1973 WORLD ALNIANAC 357.
I do not suggest, however, that this or any other religion was responsible for the original
enactment of the law.
-A statute which furthers a religious purpose will not be sustained unless it also furthers a
secular purpose. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
[Vol. 52
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Court reached the correct result in Griswold.5 1 But, unless we are pre-
pared to accept "Platonic Guardianism" run rampant, Griswold must
be deemed to approach the outer boundary of proper judicial invalida-
tion of a statute not explicitly nor implicitly forbidden by a specific
constitutional provision."
There are several serious analytical defects in Roe and Doe which
I have chosen not to develop because of the danger of obfuscating their
most significant deficiencies. 5 There is, however, one especially trou-
bling outgrowth of these cases with which I shall close this segment of
the article, namely the willingness of members or future members of the
legal profession to applaud the abortion cases for their result (substan-
1l do not, however, believe that the Court's penumbral approach is sound. Unless the Court
is suggesting that sexual intercourse is a penumbral form of speech (a suggestion it does not appear
to he making), it is hard to see how the type of privacy involved in Griswold has anything to do
with the specilics of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, the Griswold penumbral approach would seem to
justify the Lochner result more than its own. After all, isn't the "right to make a contract" more
closely related to the clause in article I, section 10, forbidding States to "pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts" than the right to use contraceptives is to the first, third,
fourth or fifth amendments?
Professor Ely in an otherwise excellent article seems to suggest that Griswold is explicable on
a fourth amendment rationale in that "enforcement would have been virtually impossible without
the most outrageous sort of governmental prying into the privacy of the home." Ely, supra note
10, at 930 (emphasis deleted). This cannot justify the result in Griswold's case since as to her, there
was no unlawful search. If one cannot raise a fourth amendment claim when another is unconstitu-
tionally searched, Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), afortiori, no such claim can be
raised because another might be subject to such a search.
In my view, Justices Harlan and White, 381 U.S. at 499 and 502 respectively, who analyzed
the problem in due process terms, wrote the soundest opinions in Griswold.
171 an not calling for, nor do I support a Constitutional amendment to overturn Roe and Doe.
Although I believe the Court egregiously erred in these cases, it is better to live with the error than
to set a precedent for amending the Constitution to restrict liberty after the Court has spoken. An
amendment here could lead to amendments in such areas as school integration, school prayer, and
reapportionment. I believe that one of this nation's great strengths has been its unwillingness to
amend away these liberties. I do not believe that it is worth departing from this sound course of
conduct even to overturn decisions as wrong as Roe and Doe. I am especially opposed to any right
to life amendment for fetuses. This would curtail legislative judgments in favor of maternal free-
dom which would be as unfortunate an interference with the public will as Roe itself was. See note
18 supra.
'One analytical dilliculty is the Court's unwillingness to allow medical regulations (other than
that the operator be a licensed physician) during the first trimester. The fact that abortion at this
time is safer than childbirth is irrelevant unless the Court is also holding that such regulations in
regard to childbirth would be unconstitutional. Perhaps the theory is one of equal protection in
that childbirth is not in fact so regulated. Even so, however, this is an area where States have
traditionally had the maximum latitude under equal protection as well as'due process. See, e.g.,
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). But cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
For further comments on the deficiencies of Roe, see Ely, note 10 supra.
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tially free abortion) while at the same time recognizing, but relegating
to relative insignificance, the insubstantiality of their doctrinal base." I
don't suppose that this is the first time expediency has ever prevailed
over principle'" nor is it likely to be the last." Yet, this truism scarcely
makes it more palatable. Indeed, although the cause of civil liberty was
perhaps the "winner" this time '2 -there is no guarantee that this will
always be so. The Court has recently invalidated (though not on this
theory) a law designed to extend the franchise to eighteen year olds,
6 3
and our current President is hardly making devotion to libertarianism
a criterion for Court membership.64 Thus it seems clear that it was
"Platonic Guardianism" and not libertarianism that ultimately pre-
vailed in Roe. And for those libertarians who cannot see a difference,
just remember who's appointing the "Guardians."
OBSCENITY CASES
Like the abortion cases, the five obscenity cases65 reflect good in-
tentions, though of a different sort.66 Unfortunately, they also mirror the
Court's willingness to substitute its wisdom for values fairly inferable
from the Constitution. 7
Prior to these decisions, the criteria for determining obscenity (all
'A recent article defending Roe is entitled: The Forest and the Trees, see Heyman & Barzelay,
note 17 supra. This metaphor, though a bit hackneyed, expresses my concern very well. No matter
how beautiful the tree of substantially free abortion (or how wonderful its fruit in alleviating human
suffering) may be, it is not worth planting if to do so would destroy the entire forest of principled
judicial analysis. Of course, this observation is not directed at the authors of "The Forest and the
Trees" who have made an important contribution to the overall understanding of Roe v. Wade by
their scholarly (though in my view, erroneous) analysis.
"Arguably, the process (at least in constitutional law) began with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(I Cranch) 137 (1803).
"Indeed, the President of the United States has practically made devotion to the expedient of
aiding the "peace forces . . . to protect the innocent from criminal elements" a prerequisite for
membership on the Court. See Ely, supra note 10, at 945-46.
'WMaternal, if not fetal.
'Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), invalidating that portion of the Federal Voting
Rights Law that purported to extend the franchise to eighteen year olds in State elections. Of
course, this decision has been effectively overturned by the twenty-sixth amendment.
'Wee note 61 supra.
"Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973): Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628
(1973): United States v. 12-200 Ft. Reels of Super 8 MM. Film, 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973); United
States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973).
'"The desire "to maintain a decent society". Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628,
2636 (1973).
"Perhaps somewhat more justifiably than Roe in light of the Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957), precedent. See notes 71-76 and accompanying text infra.
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of which needed to coalesce) were
that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole [appeal]
to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material [be] patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material
[be] utterly without redeeming social value s
The new obscenity cases, specifically Miller v. California, altered
the tests to
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest, . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.69
Before evaluating the impact and wisdom of these changes, it is
helpful to consider that which the Court did not change, viz: its self-
created doctrine that obscenity is not speech. While normally adherence
to precedent is not the sort of judicial conduct that warrants comment,
here the Court was employing these cases as vehicles for reconsideration
of the entire obscenity question.
70
The "obscenity is not speech" doctrine originated in Roth v. United
States wherein the Court opined that "implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming
social importance. ' 71 Although Roth is not the only case where the
Court credited (or blamed) history for a result the court itself officially
pronounced for the first time many years later,72 the paucity of its
historical documentation was appalling. It referred to a highly ambigu-
ous letter written by the Continental Congress to the inhabitants of
Quebec in 1774 7 and to state anti-obscenity laws enacted after the first
1"lMcmoirs" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
'93 S. Ct. at 2615.
-"This is one of a group of 'obscenity-pornography' cases being reviewed by the Court in a
re-examination of standards enunciated in earlier cases involving what Mr. Justice Harlan called
'the intractable obscenity problem.'" Id. at 2610.
71354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
,See. e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
,The letter said:
The importance of this [freedom of the press] consists of truth, science, morality, and
arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Govern-
ment, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential
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amendment was adopted but before it became applicable to the states. 74
This insubstantiality of historical documentation was exacerbated by
the Court's failure to mention the countervailing historical evidence
suggested by Judge Frank in the Second Circuit's treatment of the Roth
case.15 Lack of direct historical support, of course, does not preclude a
determination that obscenity is not constitutionally protected speech. It
does, however, impose an obligation on those who would so hold to
proffer some other justification. Roth gave us virtually none."
There was good reason to believe that the Roth "obscenity is not
speech" doctrine had been overruled in Stanley v. Georgia, where the
Court held that Roth did not apply to the viewing of obscenity in the
privacy of one's home.7 In the course of its opinion, the Court empha-
sized that first amendment rights were involved and that the State could
not punish Stanley without some justification sufficient to outweigh
Stanley's first amendment claim. To Georgia's argument that it had a
legitimate interest in protecting the individual's mind from the effects
of obscenity, the Court issued this ringing denunciation:
We are not certain that this argument amounts to anything more than
the assertion that the State has the right to control the moral content
of a person's thoughts. To some, this may be a noble purpose, but it
is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment
. . . . Nor is it relevant that obscenity in general, or the particular
films before the Court, are arguably devoid of any ideological content.
The line between the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is
much too elusive for this Court to draw, if indeed such a line can be
drawn at all.Y8
promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimi-
dated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.
354 U.S. at 484.
T7The statutes and cases cited by the Court range from 1800 to 1843. Id. at 484-85 n.13. Or
course, the first amendment was clearly not applicable to the states prior to the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment in 1868, (see Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) (1833)) and probably
was not applicable to them prior to Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
73237 F.2d 796, 806-09 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion). Judge Frank appears to indicate
that at least Franklin, Jefferson and Madison believed that the first amendment protected obscen-
ity.
ult did refer to dicta from prior Supreme Court opinions and to the pervasive presence or
anti-obscenity laws throughout this and other nations.
77394 U.S. 557 (1969).
711d. at 565-66. Stanley was undercut by United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), which
upheld a conviction for distributing obscenity through the mail to an adult who had requested it.
In the course of its Reidel opinion, the Court explicitly reaffirmed Roth.
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Regardless of result, the Stanley approach is inherently sounder
than Roth because it requires the Court to evaluate the substantiality
of the State's justification for interfering with the first amendment, an
evaluation which the Court specifically refused to undertake in Roth
because of its conclusion that there was no first amendment interest to
balance against the State's desire to suppress obscenity." Although the
Miller quintology did reaffirm Roth, it seemed somewhat more willing
than Roth to evaluate the state's interest. Specifically, in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, the Court alluded to the protection of "the quality
of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in
the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself."' "
While it is hard to quarrel with the Court's conclusion that these
reasons are sufficient to justify suppression of obscenity so long as
obscenity is not speech, it seems unlikely that a similar conclusion would
have been reached had the Court held obscenity to be speech. The public
safety argument, based on the theory that exposure to obscenity might
cause crime, is undercut by the fact that there is substantial opinion
among behavioralists that obscenity does not cause crime, and, indeed,
some such opinion that it actually retards crime.81 Although when deal-
ing with matters which are outside the ambit of the first amendment,
the legislature is free to choose its theorist,"' this freedom does not
extend to legislation touching upon the "preferred" first amendment.
Where free speech is implicated, the State must do more than show that
a minority of theorists believe that obscenity increases crime and that
it chooses to believe that minority.83 The quality of life, community
environment, and tone of commerce arguments boil down to little more
than group umbrage at the pervasive presence of obscenity. Not only
would this condition not be a sufficient interest to outweigh the first
amendment, but it is the very condition that freedom of speech was
designed to create. Undoubtedly, the mass civil rights demonstrations
of the sixties were felt by many to be terribly umbrageous. Yet the Court
refused to sustain a breach of peace conviction against a civil rights
'1354 U.S. at 486-87. For a further discussion of the unsoundness of this approach, see Loewy,
Free Speech: The "Missing Link" in the Law of Obscenity, 16 J. PUB. L. 81 (1967).
193 S. Ct. at 2635.
"See Loewy, supra note 79 at 90-95; cf. REPORT OF COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND
PORNOGRAPHY 26-27 (1970).
"2The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics."
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, until Roe v. Wade,
nothing in the Constitution incorporated Jane Roe's social ethics.
"'See. e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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leader who led a demonstration -of 1,500 blacks in a predominantly
white business section of Baton Rouge, Louisiana.,
Although there.are other reasons for controlling obscenity such as
protection of minors and privacy, it is clear that the obscenity statutes
at bar were not narrowly drawn with a view towards protecting only
those interests.
85
Turning to the Court's new tripartite test, there does not seem to
be much difference from the Roth-Memoirs standard in the first or
"prurient interest" part of the test. The Court still has not explained
why an appeal to the "prurient interest"8 is less worthy than an appeal
to an interest in excessive bloodshed, an appeal which the Court held
to be constitutionally protected in Winters v. New York."7 Nor has it
shown how this phrase is any less vague than "collections of criminal
deeds of bloodshed or lust . . . 'so massed as to become vehicles for
inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person'" which was
held unconstitutionally vague in Winters."5 Two changes that the Court
did make in this part of the test were (I) to insert the phrase "contempo-
rary community standards" (formerly in the "patently offensive" part
of the test) and (2) to indicate that the standards need not be national,
but can be local. 89 At this juncture, it does not appear possible to assess
accurately the impact of these changes.9
To the Court's credit, it did attempt to remedy the vagueness of
the "patently offensive" segment of the test by requiring the legislature
or judiciary of a State to specifically define the type of sexual conduct
that people are forbidden to depict or describe in a patently offensive
way. Unfortunately, this does not get at the heart of the vagueness
"Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
"For a discussion of the sufficiency of these interests, see Loewy, supra note 79, at 90-106.
"For various definitions of "prurient," see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20
(1957).
'-333 U.S. 507 (1948).
Id. at 513. Neither the phrases "average person," "contemporary community standards,"
nor the phrase "taken as a whole" render "prurient interest" significantly less vague.
"Since no opinion of the Court had ever explicitly required the standards to be national, it is
arguable that this does not constitute a change.
"One ruling which the Court made explicit for the first time was that expert testimony is not
a constitutional prerequisite to a determination of obscenity. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93
S. Ct. 2628, 2634-35 (1973). Hopefully, this will at least reduce the tremendous misallocation of
citizens' time. To give just one egregious example, in Georgia's abortive effort to convict Robert
Stanley of possession of an obscene film in the privacy of his home, the State availed itself of the
services of a pastor, a service station attendant, two assistant solicitors general, a retired locono-
tive engineer, an optometrist, and a real estate salesman to show that the film contravened "con-
temporary standards." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (Transcript 105-18).
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problem. A movie producer may know that he cannot depict sexual
intercourse in a patently offensive way, but he does not know whether
a court or jury will find a given depiction patently offensive. Thus, his
natural course of action would be to avoid any depiction of sexual
intercourse at all, thereby eliminating protected as well as unprotected
speech.'"
The Court's rejection of the "utterly without redeeming social
value" test is, in terms of practical impact, the most devastating blow
to free expression in these decisions. To be sure, the "redeeming social
value" test had its deficiencies. First of all, it totally ignored the value
inherent in obscenity itself." Secondly, it forced publishers of "dirty
books" to put a bunch of scientific or pseudo-scientific textual materials
into the books so that they could be sold to people who just wanted to
look at "dirty pictures. '9 3 Finally, the test required the Court to pass
on social importance. Apart' from the time consuming nature of this
task, the Court is simply not qualified to perform it. Being composed
of fallible human beings, the Court necessarily runs the risk of being
unable to discern social value where social value may exist. Such a risk
should not be run unless there is a compelling reason to do so, a condi-
tion which is noticeably absent from the obscenity area. 4 Despite
1Crf Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519 (1947). Of course, I am aware that there has
not been excessive reluctance by authors and movie producers to depict sexual intercourse. How-
ever, a producer who knows that his material will be saved if it has the "slightest redeeming social
value" probably will not be very concerned with the vagueness of a separate test which he does
not have to meet. With "redeeming social value" removed, however, "patent offensiveness" be-
comes more important as a criterion for determining the obscenity vel non of a book or movie.
-It obviously has entertainment value for those who enjoy this sort of thing. Furthermore,
some hehavioralists believe that reading erotic literature, including obscenity, has a beneficial
psychological effect on the reader. See, e.g., E. KRONHAUSEN & P. KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY
AND THE LAw 273-74 (1959). Of course, the Court doesn't have to believe people like the Kronhau-
sens. But, as I have written elsewhere,
when respectable psychiatric opinion suggests that obscenity has importance, the Court
should not deny it constitutional protection on the ground that it is "utterly without
redeeming social importance." Rather, the Court should recognize that obscenity might
have social importance and in a free society, where speech has a "preferred position,"
no utterance which might have social importance should be denied constitutional protec-
tion in the absence of a compelling state interest.
Loewy. supra note 79, at 87.
"T'his may not sound like a worthy interest to protect, but the first amendment is not limited
to worthy interests. Of course, a person just wishing to read the text of such a scientific work has
to pay a grossly inflated price for it because it contains a bunch of "dirty pictures" that he doesn't
want.
"As the Court said in Winters:
The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of
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these deficiencies, the "redeeming social value" test did have one impor-
tant virtue. If the work had any recognizable value at all, it could not
be condemned to the fire." Thus, the situation under this test was not
very different from what it would have been had the Court opted for an
"obscenity-is-constitutionally-protected-speech" rule." The situation
will probably be quite different under the new test. To begin with, not
all value will suffice. In order to save the work, the value must be
"literary, artistic, political, or scientific."97 Moreover, this value must
be serious. Hence, a judicial determination that the political satire in a
movie such as "I Am Curious (Yellow)" is not "serious" could condemn
that work. In addition, this "serious value" must permeate the work as
a whole. Presumably, therefore, a work could have "serious literary or
artistic value" for a portion of it and yet be doomed because of its
failure to maintain that value "taken as a whole." But the most signifi-
cant deficiency of the new test is that it rejects the very doctrinal founda-
tion upon which the "obscenity is not speech" rule was predicated. It is
one thing to say that speech with "utterly no redeeming social Value" is
not protected by the First Amendment. It is quite another to say that
speech with social value is not protected because the value isn't great
enough to measure up to a Court imposed standard."
Mr. Justice Brennan emerges from these decisions as a tragic figure
not unlike the legendary Baron Von Frankenstein. Decrying the Court's
[freedom of the press]. Everyone is familiar with instances of propoganda through
liction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see
nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled
to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.
333 U.S. at 510. Candor compels the disclosure that via dictum the Court did except obscenity
from these libertarian sentiments. It did not, however, even attempt to justify this exclusion beyond
its characterization of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting" as "words well
understood through long use in the criminal law" (id. at 518), a characterization, which to say the
least, has not withstood the test of time.
'5Btut tf Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972), where the Court said that "[a] quotation
from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene
publication."
"With two unfortunate exceptions: First, the conviction of Ralph Ginzburg, Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), which I have criticized elsewhere, Loewy, The Warren Court
As Defender of State and Federal Criminal Laws, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1218, 1220-23 (1969),
and secondly, the terrible misallocation of judicial, prosecutorial, police, defense lawyer, and
citi/en resources necessary to attempt to enforce an anti-obscenity law. See note 90 supra.
"Noticeably absent from the new test is "historical value" which helped save "Fanny Hill,"
"Memoirs" v. Massachusetts,,383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).




continued adherence to the "obscenity is not speech" doctrine, he was
unable to cage the monster he had created. And create it he did. Practi-
cally every major formative obscenity opinion was written by Brennan."
Yet, had he, along with Mr. Justice Stewart,' 0 recognized the inherent
intolerable vagueness in any of the obscenity tests (the basis of Bren-
nan's dissent which Stewart joined) 0' prior to Mr. Justice Black's death,
they (Brennan and Stewart) could have joined with Justices Black,
Douglas and Marshall' to hold that obscenity is speech. Nevertheless,
Brennan, who wrote the dissent, and to a lesser extent, Stewart, who
joined it, are to be commended for their new-found efforts to evaluate
the role of obscenity under the first amendment, free of the emotional
revulsion that one often senses in discussion of this subject. Who knows,
maybe some day the monster finally will be caged.'
ABORTION CASES VIs-A-VIs OBSCENITY CASES
Even if one could accept the abortion cases, the obscenity cases, or
both standing alone, they are totally irreconcilable when compared one
with the other.
First of all, let us consider the source of the respective rights. The
right to abortion is said to be part of the right to privacy' which is
found in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Presuma-
"E.g.. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964)
(plurality opinion); "Memoirs" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion); Ginz-
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
11Justice Stewart, though not as instrumental as his brother Brennan in perpetuating the
obscenity myth, surely did his share. Although conceding that the term obscenity (or his synonym
for it, "hardcore pornography") may be undefinable, he was prepared to "know it when [he] see[s]
it.- Jacohellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). In Ginzburg v. United
States, he suggested that "[t]here does exist a distinct and easily identifiable class of material in
which all of these elements [of obscenity] coalesce." 383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added).
1193 S. Ct. at 2642.
10Although Mr. Justice Marshall (who joined Brennan's opinion in Paris Adult Theatre 1) had
not clearly taken this position in prior cases, his opinion for the Court in Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969), coupled with his narrow concurrence in United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351,
360 (1971), suggest that he was prepared to so hold.
10 As with the abortion cases, I have chosen to focus on only the most significant deficiencies
or the obscenity cases. Among other unfortunate aspects of these decisions were the holding in
Lnited States v. Orito that the right to view obscenity did not include the right to transport an
obscene film in interstate commerce, 93 S. Ct. at 2674, and the willingness in Kaplan v. California
to allow words as well as pictures to be deemed obscene.
1n2l am willing to assume this arguendo, although it seems unsound. See text accompanying
notes 9-13 supra.
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bly the right got there because of its penumbral relationship to various
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.0M The right to distribute obscen-
ity, on the other hand, arguably comes from the first amendment. Even
accepting the Court's premise that obscenity is not technically speech,
it is surely no more than a thin and vague line away from being speech.
Clearly, the right to obtain an abortion is less directly related to or
deeper in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights than the privilege to
publish or distribute words or pictures that appeal to the prurient inter-
est, are patently offensive, and lack serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value. Yet in Roe, the Court emphasized that the state's
interest in precluding abortions must be compelling and that it was not
permitted to adopt that the theory of life which overrode the rights of
the pregnant woman."°6 But in Paris Adult Theatre I, the Court empha-
sized that since anti-obscenity legislation did not impinge "upon rights
protected by the Constitution itself", the state was perfectly free to act
upon unproven assumptions. 0
When we examine the respective state interests, it seems clear that
the anti-abortion interests outweigh the anti-obscenity interest. How-
ever much one may value or not value embryonic life, it is at least a
tangible physical interest whose existence is a biological fact. The rea-
sons for condemning obscenity on the other hand are much more ether-
eal. Besides, who's to say that "the quality of life and total community
environment" are not as adversely affected by people's awareness of
abortion as it is by their awareness of obscenity. Is the Court to take
judicial notice of the "fact" that people get more upset with "dirty
movies" than with destruction of embryos or fetuses? If the permissive
society might lead to perversion of moral values and increased crime,
isn't it possible that a society which allows nearly free abortion will
come to have less respect for the sanctity of human life? I surely do not
suggest this is the case, but if speculative reasons can allow a state to
outlaw obscenity, why cannot reasons of similar quality permit it to
"'At least, that was the Griswold theory. As deep in the penumbras as the right-to-
contraception aspect of privacy is (see note 56 supra) the right-to-abortion aspect of privacy is even
further removed from the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
"'See text accompanying note 24 supra.
"093 S. Ct. 2636-37. In a footnote to the quoted statement, the Court quoted Mr. Justice
Holmes, concededly in another content, as saying: "[T]he proper course is to recognize that a state
Legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in
the Constitution of the United States or of the State, and that Courts should be careful not to
extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public




Is there any way that these cases can be reconciled? A colleague of
mine, in a moment of levity, has suggested that they are reconcilable
only on the ground that the Court is so opposed to sex that it not only
wants to prevent people from seeing it or reading about it, but it wants
them to be able to erase the evidence that they ever participated in it." 8
More seriously, I believe that both decisions are a product of constitu-
tional subordination to personal whims. 9 The Justices do not like anti-
abortion laws, but they do like anti-obscenity laws. Thus, they have
created a right to abortion on the one hand, and an exception to the first
amendment on the other. Surely, the late Mr. Justice Black would have
been appalled at these decisions."" Unlike him, I do not agree that the
words of the Constitution should end analysis in difficult cases.," I do,
however, think that they do, or ought to, begin analysis. Let us hope
that these cases are aberrational and that in resolving future constitu-
tional problems, the Burger Court will regard the Constitution as at
least a relevant starting point.
t'The colleague wishes to remain anonymous.
"*Perhaps unconsciously, they reflect the upper middle class ethic that nice people don't read
obscenity, hut if one's daughter gets pregnant, an abortion is O.K.
"'See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Jacobellis v.
Ohio. 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
"'This would be the ultimate "strict constructionist" position.
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